Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights
Volume 1 | Issue 1

Article 4

Fall 2004

The International Court of Justice and Armed
Conflict?
Abraham Sofaer

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr
Recommended Citation
Abraham Sofaer, The International Court of Justice and Armed Conflict?, 1 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 1 (2004).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol1/iss1/4

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

1 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 4, at
http//:www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v1/4

Volume 1 Fall 2004

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND ARMED
CONFLICT
Abraham D. Sofaer∗
I.

Introduction

¶ 1 Good afternoon. I will do my best to be as crisp as possible and to
communicate my thoughts about the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and its role
regarding use of force. I intend to cover the law relating to when force may be used, not
how it should be used. So, in that sense my comments supplement what Dan Bethlehem
has covered.1

II.

The International Court of Justice and Its Position on the Use of Force

¶ 2 Everyone agrees the ICJ is important. Its role is especially important when it
comes to the use of force. Though it rarely makes a statement about the use of force,
certainly a ruling about the use of force, when States submit to the ICJ’s jurisdiction and
do it deliberately, they abide by what the ICJ tells them to do. It’s almost like night
follows day. In addition to that, States and lawyers refer to ICJ rulings repeatedly as
guides to their conduct. They don’t always follow the Court’s rulings, but they look at
them and they consider them. If they find a decision lacking in logic and practicality,
they make a judgment to that effect, and sometimes engage in conduct inconsistent with
such a ruling. But that doesn’t mean states—and the U.S. in particular—don’t take those
rulings seriously. So, when the ICJ speaks, each occasion is a great opportunity to
influence those ends that are served potentially by an ICJ decision—peace, justice, and
humanitarian rights.
¶ 3 The Court has in fact carved out a potentially significant role in the area of use

of force in international security. I will go through informally a series of points that show
where the ICJ has indicated through some ruling or some practice that it intends to keep
itself in the game when it comes to use of force decisions.
¶ 4 First, the ICJ has insisted on the right to decide its own jurisdiction. That in

itself gives the Court great power to become involved in these kinds of questions.
Second, the Court has broadly construed treaties to assume power over use of force
situations. The Oil Platforms case2 is an example: the Court took a Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation treaty and found that even though this treaty did not address
∗
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Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Dec. 12).

the issue of use of force directly—because the parties used the treaty to engage in
commerce and be friends—the preliminary words of the treaty were enough of a ground
to take jurisdiction. And this decision was made even though a separate treaty between
Iran and the United States—the Agreement of Cooperation of 19593—actually dealt with
the use of force and reserved to each party the right to do whatever it needed to do in its
national security interests. So, the Court has shown a willingness, and indeed maybe an
eagerness, to construe treaties that are before it broadly to take jurisdiction over use of
force issues.
¶ 5 Next, the Court in the Nicaragua case broadly construed the concept of
customary international law to assume authority over use of force decisions—even where
the states involved took reservations from a multi-lateral treaty covering the same area of
the law that “customary law” covered.4 The Court also has broadly construed its advisory
opinion jurisdiction, as it did in the Nuclear Weapons case,5 to take an active role in
deciding the legality of possessing or using nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in the
Lockerbie case the Court took jurisdiction to decide the legality of Security Council
resolutions bearing upon international security as it did in 1998.6
¶ 6 In taking jurisdiction over these cases, the Court has disregarded or treated

lightly doctrines limiting the ICJ’s power or discretion to avoid political questions.7 The
Court has swept aside any indication in the earlier jurisprudence of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, and in scholarly work, urging the Court to be reluctant to exercise
jurisdiction in use of force cases.8
¶ 7 In the area of provisional measures, the Court has shown its willingness to
assert itself, even in a use of force or security context, or at least to retain the right to
assert itself.9 This is very significant not only because now provisional measures must be
treated as mandatory rules, but because the Court has no tradition of applying the
provisional measures doctrine in a manner similar and analogous to the way the U.S. or
Britain applies preliminary injunctive law with strong emphasis on likelihood of success.
The ICJ in the Paraguay case10 declined even to address the issue of likelihood of
success. The language the Court used, and the way the Court went about issuing
preliminary relief, explicitly avoided an evaluation of the meaning of the treaty at issue,
causing the United States to feel that it could disregard the preliminary order.
¶ 8 The combined effect of these positions (and others) gives the Court a

substantial set of opportunities to speak out on use of force issues. Keeping in mind that
the Court, while now over fifty-years-old, has only relatively recently become activist on
3
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use of force questions, we should expect that in the next twenty-years we will see
opinions that will deal with use of force questions that could have a major impact either
in terms of articulating principles that are followed by states (and therefore a major
impact in shaping the law on conduct of states), or undermining the Court’s credibility
and status by articulating principles that fail to serve well the practical and conceptual
needs of international security.
¶ 9 Therefore, the important jurisdiction that the Court has carved out for itself,
based on all the principles that I have just described, is neither good nor bad. Much
depends on how the jurisdiction is used. The law on the use of force is in transition and it
is unclear whether the ICJ will develop a set of rules that has a positive impact on the
world. I find evidence that the Court has started off on the wrong foot and much must be
done to improve the chances that the ICJ will play a constructive and meaningful role
going forward.
¶ 10 First, the Court’s basic approach to the use of force is flawed. International

lawyers tend to take a “push button” approach in applying U.N. Charter rules. They look
at Article 2.4,11 and conclude that force may not be used without Security Council
approval even to advance Charter purposes. They look at Article 5112 and international
lawyers in general and most international decisions that bear on this issue conclude that
self-defense may be exercised only in response to an “attack”, even though that provision
states that nothing in the Charter should be read to limit that “inherent” right.13 The pushbutton approach then leads to the conclusion that, if a particular use of force does not
satisfy one of those bases for using force, it’s illegal.14 If it does, then it’s legal.
¶ 11 This approach conflicts with the process we know rational human beings

really go through when they decide whether to act in a certain manner. People do not
appraise the wisdom of conduct by looking at each of the factors and doctrines relevant to
that question in isolation. Rather, we consider what evidence there is that bears on
whatever the criteria are that we believe should be looked at to determine propriety
(including legality). And if on balance we conclude that a strong case exists for using
force, we say it should be lawful. If on balance we conclude that it’s a weak case on
using force, we conclude that force should be prohibited. In this regard, if you look at
Article 2.4 of the Charter,15 it isn’t at all something that would justify anyone saying,
“This is a clear prohibition on the use of force for any purpose whatsoever.” The article
is quite complex and parts of it are substantively significant. By that I mean parts of it
11
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signify a preference with a regard to values, and this of course has been anathema in most
international law scholarship. The idea that you could use force more justifiably for
purpose “A” as opposed to purpose “B” has been something, especially during the Cold
War, that has been treated as inappropriate and wrong.
¶ 12 But Article 2.4 at one point refers to the purposes of the Charter as a relevant

factor in evaluating the use of force.16 And we know what the Charter stands for, it’s not
a mystery, it’s written there. The Charter stands for human rights. The Charter stands for
equal treatment of women and men. The Charter stands for religious freedom. The
Charter stands for states not being able to acquire other territory through the use of force.
The Charter suggests specific moral and ethical principles, and those principles have in
fact been developed in subsequent treaties.
¶ 13 I have argued that the Charter’s language supports the use of force approach

of the United States, which is based in part on an early Abe Chayes’ article, in which he
called for a “common lawyer” approach to the use of force, and which he wrote while he
was Legal Adviser.17 I have been a big advocate of the early Abe Chayes, though Chayes
changed his position after leaving office. I investigated whether other Legal Advisers
advocated the “common lawyer” approach while in office, and found a few articles
written while they were Legal Advisers advocating the same approach.18 But most Legal
Advisers who served before me never speak up in favor of this approach once they leave
office.
¶ 14 Kosovo created a major problem for international lawyers who supported the

push-button approach. Those who favored intervening could not secure Security Council
approval of a resolution saying that force could be used. Some Security Council
resolutions demanded a cessation of the grotesque treatment of 800,000 Muslim
Kosovars. But they did not authorize force. Nor could the U.S. justify the use of force on
the basis of self-defense, collective or individual. We couldn’t call the flood of threequarters of a million people coming into the territories of NATO allies an “attack”. They
were just people trying to find safety. Finally, the U.S. could not contend on the basis of
any respectable doctrine that a decision by NATO was the equivalent of a decision by the
Security Council. Clearly it is not.
¶ 15 NATO nonetheless went ahead and stopped the monstrous treatment of the
Kosovars. NATO did so, moreover, without giving any legal rationale for its conduct.
NATO couldn’t simply create a new category for using force legitimately based on what
NATO claimed was lawful. Furthermore, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention had
not been accepted broadly as an independent basis for using force in Kosovo. What we
were left with was a series of factors that taken together made an overwhelming case for
intervening in Kosovo, though no single factor taken alone could have justified the
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action. I went through those factors in an article in the Stanford International Law
Journal.19
¶ 16 First, the Security Council had acted under Chapter 7 of the Charter, and had

found that the situation in Kosovo posed a threat to international peace and security.
Under the push-button approach, the fact that the Council had found a threat to
international peace and security is not merely an insufficient ground in itself for using
force, it is worth nothing. Under the push button approach one couldn’t consider that
action even as a factor to weigh with all the other factors to determine whether to use
force.
¶ 17 The same thing was true of other factors that clearly motivated NATO’s

action. While the doctrine of humanitarian intervention could not be relied upon as an
independently acceptable basis for action, the fact is that the humanitarian crisis was
triggered by conduct that violated several widely accepted norms incorporated into
treaties. These include probably the Genocide Convention,20 certainly the Laws of War,21
the Geneva Convention,22 and some other provisions that established that the Yugoslav
government was violating international law.
¶ 18 Another factor was that the NATO states unanimously considered the

situation a threat to the stability of Europe. Several U.N. Security Council resolutions
relating to Yugoslavia had found that Yugoslavia had already violated international law
and was violating international law within its territory in its treatment of Muslims. An
International Criminal Court had been created, which had jurisdiction over international
crimes committed by officials of the Yugoslav government. Thus, even though the
Security Council had not authorized the use of force,23 very strong moral and legal case
existed for its use.
¶ 19 Now, what happened? International lawyers in general concluded that what

NATO did in Kosovo was illegal by accepted principles, but that it was necessary and
morally justifiable. It was necessary and moral, but nonetheless illegal! Most
international lawyers concluded that Kosovo should be treated as a particular situation,
limited to its special facts. I would be satisfied with that rationale, as long as I could cite
what was done in Kosovo in future cases if the same factors once again appeared in
another situation. This would represent the common lawyer technique in determining the
propriety of using force. This is a process where you’re not going to blind yourself to a
factor just because it alone does not establish authority to act.
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¶ 20 The same limited approach is applied under Article 51.24 The greatest evil of

all evils, Professor Louis Henkin wrote in an article based on a debate at the New York
City Bar Association,25 is using force, even in self-defense. In the Nicaragua case,26 the
ICJ interpreted an attack in a way that significantly narrowed the inherent right of selfdefense. Anything short of a full-fledged attack, such as providing arms, strategic advice
or tactical assistance to a country that was trying to overthrow a government of another
country, cannot be considered an attack under Article 51 for purposes of collective selfdefense. That served the Soviet Union’s purposes very well. They were assisting
communist groups and governments around the world in trying to undermine elected
governments. So long as they did not engage in an all-out attack, the U.S. and other
allies could not use force to counter their efforts.
¶ 21 Under long-accepted traditional principles, what rule should be applied when

you have a lesser attack? Well, it would seem that if you have a lesser attack you can
only respond in a lesser way; you can only respond with lesser, proportionate measures,
individually or collectively. But in Nicaragua, the Court created a new category of
attacks that denied the collective use of force. It also purported to establish formalistic
requirements of notice of requests for cooperative defense that no one had ever heard of,27
and limited collective self-defense to military action on the territory of the state that had
been attacked.28
¶ 22 In retrospect, several writers and the former President of the Court, Stephen
Schwebel, have concluded that the authority of the Niceragua decision is questionable.29
I agree. That decision certainly has not facilitated the defense of sovereign states or the
respectability of international law.
¶ 23 The threat of terrorism has led the U.N. Security Council, at least, to interpret
self-defense in a manner that is far more robust than the ICJ’s approach. Security
Council resolutions adopted after 9/11 did not explicitly authorize the use of force in
Afghanistan. But they do say that the U.S. is justified in exercising self-defense, and call
on all states to act to assure that the Taliban regime will perform its obligations under

24
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international law.30 Resolution 1373 details, like a statute, the obligations of states vis-àvis terrorists that operate within their borders.31
¶ 24 Many, if not most international lawyers, have reacted to the need to use force

in self-defense and in the defense of humanitarian rights by seeking to preserve what they
consider the purity of international law. Tom Franck, whom I admire greatly, wrote a
little piece in Foreign Affairs entitled “Break It, Don’t Fake It.”32 In other words, break
international law if you have to, go ahead, but don’t fake it, don’t make up international
law to justify your conduct. It would be like people in the 1930’s dealing with
Constitutional issues in the U.S. saying “Don’t make up new constitutional law, it’s going
to mess up our Constitution. Just break the Constitution, violate the Constitution, with no
explanation, and that way we will keep the purity of this rigid Constitution that the preNew Deal Supreme Court was insisting on applying. Everything will be fine someday
when we all return to the purity of the intended words.”
¶ 25 Well, the international legal system should not be immune to the development

of moral, workable rules dealing with humanity’s problems going forward. The
international lawyers who contend that the military actions in Kosovo and Afghanistan
were illegal based their position on their understanding of the purpose of the Charter.
How they got that understanding is difficult to understand. Why did the League of
Nations collapse? Why did we have that horrendous Second World War? Because we
did not use force against the Nazis when we still had an opportunity to stop them. To
think that Harry Truman and Franklin Roosevelt and all the other great statesmen that
participated in drafting the Charter would have favored narrow interpretations of use of
force doctrine in the Charter is baseless. Read what they have written, look at what they
did, and you know what kind of people they were.33 They were determined to bring about
freedom, to advance the protection of human rights, to seek to establish justice in the
world.
¶ 26 Lawyers, as Dean Acheson said, are not noted for their capacity to make
strategic judgments.34 While the use of the criminal law is a proper part of any effort to
end international crimes, states have to use force to stop people determined to engage in
terrorism or major violations of human rights. The same is true of monsters like
Milosevic.35 Criminal prosecution is fine, but to be effective one must sometimes bomb
and destroy military factions, in order to save the non-combatants at risk—such as the
800,000 human beings who were being pushed out of Kosovo and treated as cattle as they
were driven away from their homes.

30
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¶ 27 The bias against the use of force explains many of the most damaging

practices and policies of the United Nations over the last decade. The threats, the
rhetoric, not followed up by force, have led people, led states, led evil leaders to feel that
they can do horrible things to human beings with impunity. Measured uses of force
applied early can have a tremendously positive effect on the world and may well be far
more morally justifiable than measures like the economic sanctions in Iraq, where
hundreds of thousands of people suffered because of Saddam Hussein.
¶ 28 The use of force in Rwanda would have prevented the single most monstrous

act of disregard of human suffering that has happened since the Cambodian mass
murders. President Clinton went to Africa and apologized to the African people for what
he had failed to do. Allowing those people to die without using force to protect them was
disgraceful, even though it was clear that acting without Security Council approval to
stop that genocide would have violated the Charter.
¶ 29 I will end with this comment. Humanitarian law and the defense of human

rights are bound up with the rules governing the use of force. The ICJ’s reluctance to
embrace human rights stems ultimately from the same moral neutrality in interpreting
international law that underlies its use of force attitudes. The use of force is necessary
sometimes to preserve life and human rights. So long as some states’ area is controlled
by thugs, force must be given its proper position in law if human rights are to be taken
seriously and made a universal reality.
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